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Abstract The analysis is based on some moral experiences taking place during a terrorist
attack on the Norwegian Labor Party’s youth camp on the island of Utøya (outside of Oslo)
July 22, 2011, where 69 young people were killed and several seriously injured. After the
attack many of the survivors told stories of how strangers spontaneous had helped and
cared for each other. In the midst of the horror there occurred sudden ‘‘moments of
goodness’’ or ‘‘points of light’’ that revealed hope for the persons involved, as well as for
the society. The article examines these spontaneous moral practices in light of moral
educational theory, as well as discusses the terrorists own way of thinking and acting. The
spontaneous practices point toward another basis for a moral approach then a cognitive
development tradition. The importance of community is underlined, as well as an inter-
personal dimension. In the last section the fostering of moral and ethical thinking and
acting is discussed in light of general education and the three functions of education
proposed by Biesta (Beyond learning: democratic education for a human future. Paradigm
Publishers, Boulder, 2010). It is suggested that moral education could contribute something
to all of the three dimensions but based on the experiences from Utøya, there will be a
particular emphasis on the subjectification function of education.
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Introduction
The following analysis is based on a specific event, namely the terrorist attack on the
Norwegian Labor Party’s youth camp on the island of Utøya on July 22, 2011, where 69
young people were killed and several seriously injured. After the attack, those involved
could tell stories of how strangers had helped and cared for each other. In the midst of the
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horror, sudden ‘‘moments of goodness’’ occurred, revealing hope and a sense of com-
munity. Retrospectively, these ‘‘points of light’’ turned out to be of great significance not
only for the youth involved and their families, but also for Norwegian society as a whole.
In the following I wish to explore these spontaneous moral practices further, as well as
discuss the terrorist’s own way of thinking and acting. The latter is derived from his own
description 1 year later. During the trial he gave a detailed account of his mental training
before the attack and the extensive practical preparations. My assumption is that this very
dramatic event that involved death and life, darkness and light, might indicate some basic
knowledge about meaningful moral practices, as well as the contrary. Several of the
experiences and stories coming out of Utøya may be characterized as a form of sponta-
neous moral practice. The spontaneity seems to be triggered by the situation and by other
persons’ needs. In light of ethical theory, this spontaneity may be worth further explora-
tion. I will argue that the spontaneous actions are in sharp contrast to the terrorist’s various
well-planned techniques, which were intended to create distance and to close himself off
from ‘‘disturbing’’ influences from surroundings and from other people. On the contrary, I
wish to explore how the spontaneous ethical practice emphasizes involvement and
community.
The article has the following outline: I will start by providing a presentation of the
attack and various examples of concrete situations where help and care were given. These
are in contrast to the terrorist’s deliberate use of various distancing techniques. I will then
relate the descriptions of various people’s acts to moral educational theory, starting with
Stuart Dreyfus’ and Hubert Dreyfus’ distinction between moral practice as either a
deliberate or a spontaneous practice. Further, a special focus will be on the spontaneous
character of the acts and on exploring the interpersonal dimension involved. This will lead
to another basis for the moral approach. Inspired by the thoughts of Knud E. Løgstrup,
spontaneity is understood to be an expression of connection in a common life-world. In the
final section, I will discuss the different moral approaches in light of general education.
Normative dimensions currently tend to be ignored within the general field of education. I
wish to prove the relevance of these dimensions and will do so based on Biesta’s (2010)
descriptions of three general functions of education. Based on the experiences from Utøya,
the dimension of community is of particular significance.
The Terror Attack on Utøya
On July 22, 2011, a Norwegian right wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, set off a
huge car bomb in front of the Government Quarter buildings in Oslo, seriously damaging
these as well as other buildings in the vicinity. Nine people were killed in the blast. The
extremist’s intention was to destroy the core of the present political leadership, the gov-
ernment, the top state administration and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg from the Labor
Party. Immediately after this bomb attack, the culprit went on to the island of Utøya where
the Labor Party’s future elite had gathered for their annual summer camp. Here, about 600
young people between 14 and 25 years of age were gathered and his goal was, as he
explained during the trial against him, to kill them all. Equipped with several guns, he
landed on the small island and opened fire. He chased the young people around the island
in an attack which lasted about 90 min. The trial revealed that both the bomb explosion in
the Government Quarter and the killings on Utøya were a result of a long, meticulous
planning process that started as far back as 2006. Everything had been planned down to the
smallest detail: the purchase of weapons, a uniform and chemicals for the construction of
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bombs, the bomb construction itself and the actual implementation of the terror attacks. In
the courtroom, the perpetrator spent hours explaining all the details of the planning pro-
cess, plans that succeeded and plans that failed. For example, due to a lack of chemicals, he
had to resort to what he called a ‘‘shooting-based operation’’ on Utøya, which he con-
sidered to be more risky and demanding compared to a ‘‘bomb operation’’.
Afterwards, when the terror attack was over, the young people told horrible stories
about the mass killings. In contrast, they also told ‘‘ordinary’’ stories of goodness and
community, as well as remarkable stories of great courage and bravery. For example, there
was a story of a person that silently grasped another person’s hand, a teenage girl who
gently comforted a younger child, a boy who lent his jacket to another boy next to him who
was desperate, wet and shivering. A girl was hit by several bullets and cried for help. Some
youngsters came running and carried her to a safer place. They used their clothes to press
against her wounds and were able to stop the bleeding. At the risk of their own lives, they
promised to stay with her until the shooting was over. They kept their promise and they all
survived (Fædrelandsvennen, May 16, 2012). There was the story of a girl who, while
running to escape the bullets flying all around her, stopped to help a boy whose pants had
gotten caught in some scrap metal lying on the ground and who, in his panicked state, was
unable to pull himself loose. She stopped and bent down in order to help him, and once
they had succeeded in freeing him, began running, hand in hand, away from the shooter
(Verdens Gang, Oct. 5, 2011; Fædrelandsvennen, Oct. 8, 2011).
There was a mainland campground (Utvika Camping) located approximately 600–700
meters across the lake from Utøya. As soon as the tourists staying at this campground
realized what was happening on the island, they immediately set out in their leisure boats
and brought seriously injured young people to the ambulances and helicopters waiting for
them on the mainland. They did so while in danger of being killed themselves; many very
moving stories have been told about their heroic efforts (Verdens Gang, Dec. 22, 2011).
Interviews conducted with the group of volunteers reveal what appears to be a common
reaction when these people realized the gravity of the situation; they acted immediately
and threw themselves into the many emergency rescue activities that were taking place:
Several people ran to their boats and drove through the hail of bullets in order to pick up
swimmers while others ran back to their camp sites to get dry clothing. Yet others offered
comforting words as well as food and drinks to the soaked survivors. An interview with
rescuers Bjørn and Aase Margrethe Juvet (Aftenposten, Aug. 23, 2011) is illustrative of the
fact that jumping into the rescue operation came naturally to several of those involved.
Bjørn Juvet was one of the first to go out to rescue young people from the water, while his
wife stood on the pier in order to receive the survivors as they were brought to shore. They
said, ‘‘Our first reaction was to help. We saw human beings in a crisis situation who were
fighting for their lives. Even when we were being shot at, our focus the whole time was on
the young people in the water, getting them into the boat, getting them into the boat….
That was all that mattered’’ (Interview in Aftenposten, Aug. 23, 2011).
Care and assistance were given in many situations on this day: the young people on the
island helped one another when they could and the mainland rescuers helped young people
in need. These acts were carried out irrespective of previous acquaintance, ethnicity or
gender. While I have no empirical data to support the following claim, at the time of the
horrific events, any ‘‘differences’’—which can often create distance between people—were
considered irrelevant and were therefore ignored, as it was far more important for these
people to experience a connection with one another than to promote their own unique
characteristics and sense of being different from the others present. Rather, this connection
provided these individuals with strength under trying circumstances since the experience of
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being met with care, help and comfort was significant for them. Furthermore, their sense of
community and connection appeared to create a kind of insight to which they could cling—
both during the attack and during the weeks and months that followed and their stories
touched something basic that was echoed in the rest of the Norwegian society.
The example I have chosen here is extremely dramatic and quite unique in Norwegian
history. Those involved were ordinary people—not professional health care personnel.
Their actions ranged from small and nearly invisible ones, such as grabbing another
person’s hand, to selflessly heroic acts of courage despite mortal danger. For instance, as
the Juvets explained in their newspaper interview: ‘‘We did not make a conscious
decision to help, it just happened. It was not a choice we made; we acted on autopilot
without thinking it over for very long. We could not watch people drown without trying
to help them with any means we had available to us’’ (Aftenposten, Aug. 23, 2011).
There may be several reasons why the Juvets acted on autopilot, including the fact that,
when coming face to face with hardship, people tend to feel a strong impulse to act.
However, a common feature of all these people was that they nearly always acted
immediately and instinctively, which was in stark contrast to the terrorist’s systematic,
detail-oriented planning and his effort to develop a distance—involving social, emotional
and language dimensions.
The Terrorist’s Different Distancing Techniques
The issue of distance played a profound role for the terrorist both during the attack, as
well as in the planning process beforehand. Even the terrorist’s outfit on the day of the
attack indicates distance. It could be seen as an attempt to masquerade the agent of the
act and to avoid any kind of human togetherness (Arendt 1998, p. 180). He was dressed
in a police-like uniform with home-made police badges. The outfit was chosen delib-
erately. In a Norwegian context, the police enjoy a high degree of trust among the
population, and the terrorist used this to attract the young people. At the same time, this
kind of outfit helps anonymize personal traits, as the uniform is a service uniform used
by persons in a group.
The language used by the terrorist appears distancing and depersonalizing. He used a
technical, military-inspired jargon, a manner of speaking also inspired by Islam-critical
circles, computer games and online role-playing games such as World of Warcraft (Ver-
dens Gang, Dec. 2, 2011). To provide some examples: The terrorist described the attack as
‘‘spectacular’’ and ‘‘grand’’ and classified victims as ‘‘legitimate’’ and ‘‘non-legitimate’’
targets (legitimate targets were those who supported multi-culturalism). He referred to the
terror attack as an ‘‘operation’’ and bombs as ‘‘tools’’, and the executions were described in
detail, for instance in terms of whether ‘‘follow-up shots’’ were required. The original plan
was to chase the young people into the water and thereby use the water as a ‘‘weapon of
mass destruction’’.
He also distanced himself socially. He did have contact with right wing extremists and
Islam-hostile movements online, but, in the time before the operation, he isolated himself
more and more from former friends, spending an increasing amount of time in front of the
computer in his childhood home.
Perhaps the most important form of conscious distancing is what the terrorist himself
referred to as ‘‘de-emotionalization’’. This was something he had been practicing since as
early as 2006. During the trial, he said that carrying out acts like those on Utøya is contrary
to human nature. To be able to do so, he had to prepare himself mentally for a very long
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time. In this preparation process, he used various meditation techniques, which he referred
to as ‘‘daily stimulation’’, and computer games to ‘‘hammer out’’ emotions and build a
contempt of death. He said, ‘‘It is very, very difficult to implement something as barbaric
as a firearm-based operation’’. During the executions on Utøya, he behaved in a ‘‘de-
emotionalized’’ manner. Simultaneously, he said he felt threatened, which is why he was in
a state that he referred to as a ‘‘flight and fight mode’’.
These examples show how the terrorist consciously created distances in various areas of
life. He saw himself as a warrior, using the concept of war in his manner of speaking and
acting. The many different distancing techniques were intended to provide a mental shield.
When asked by the judge: ‘‘Are you an empathetic person, Breivik’’, he answered ‘‘yes,
absolutely’’. He said during the trial that what he did was ‘‘just awful’’ and ‘‘barbaric’’, but
a necessary sacrifice for the cause. During the shooting on Utøya, he shot young people
face-to-face, also those who had curled up in the fetal position, begging for their lives.
What the terrorist was attempting has certain commonalities with techniques used by
the Nazis, as described by Bauman (1987). According to Bauman, the Nazis succeeded in
overcoming the most formidable of obstacles to systematic and non-emotional cold-
blooded murder of people, namely ‘‘animal pity’’ or the urge to help those who suffer. This
is, in his opinion, a very elementary condition, and the Nazi regime focused on neutralizing
the impact of primeval moral drives (Bauman 1987, p. 185). The killings were isolated
from the sphere where such drives arise, by neutralizing, isolating and marginalizing Jews.
The process became a rational, bureaucratic, technical task According to Bauman (1987)
the importance of proximity to the Other is a building block of all moral behavior:
Proximity means responsibility, and responsibility is proximity’’ … And ‘‘the
alternative to proximity is social distance. The moral attribute of proximity is
responsibility; the moral attribute of social distance is lack of moral relationship, or
heterophobia (Bauman 1987, p. 184).
Bauman describes the distancing techniques of a political regime. In the case of Utøya, it
was an individual person that committed the terror. He was not following orders, and his
actions were not directed by obedience to an authority. His training of different distancing
techniques was well-organized and carried out with discipline and effort. As such, the
terrorist appeared to be responsible for and aware of the consequences of his actions. He
did not appear to be an agent within a chain of evil actions. His behavior was based on his
own choice and he acted independently. Vetlesen (2013) suggests that the evil involved can
be seen as ‘‘subjectivity run wild’’ (Vetlesen 2013, p. 27). However, similarities can be
seen in the ‘‘coldness’’ toward the Other, as well as the horrible consequences of the use of
distancing techniques.
The event at Utøya gives rise to many different challenges and issues. The following
discussion is limited to two aspects: Firstly, from the field of moral education: Based on
the descriptions of various people’s acts, what kinds of moral approaches are involved?
One key tradition in the field is a cognitive developmental tradition, raising the fol-
lowing issue: What could the event at Utøya tell us about the limitations of cognitive
approaches to moral education? And what other bases of moral education can be seen?
In the following I wish to suggest that there are also other options. Secondly, in the
very last section, I wish to discuss how the different approaches may have a role to play
within the context of general education. The theoretical framework for this section is
inspired by the three domains of education, according to Biesta’s book Good Education
in an Age of Measurement (2010).
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Spontaneous Moral Practice in Light of Moral Education
In Norway, unlike countries such as Britain and the USA, moral education is not a distinct
field of research and knowledge. Ethics and morals are considered to be integral parts of
the general education program. According to Rich and DeVitis (1985), moral education, in
short, refers to instruction in moral rules of conduct for the purpose of developing good
character traits and ethical behavior (Rich and DeVitis 1985, p. 6–7). The research
approach is broad; likewise the issues involved. Chazan (1985) writes: ‘‘While moral
education would appear to be the most practical of educational ventures, encompassing the
everyday realities of school and classroom life, it actually involves some of the most basic
and profound issues of human existence’’ (Chazan 1985, p. 1). The following discussion is
first limited to what Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus refer to as two different ‘‘camps’’ in the
field of moral education: The first camp understands moral practice as a deliberate act,
whereas the second camp regards moral practice as a spontaneous act.
Two Different Approaches to Moral Experience
In their article titled ‘‘What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the
Development of Ethical Expertise’’ (1990), Dreyfus and Dreyfus present two approaches to
understanding ethical expertise. The first ‘‘camp’’, according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus,
identifies with Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Ju¨rgen Habermas, according to whom
ethics is, in principle, restricted to judgment. The moral act is defined as a will-based and
intentional act in which the person has a goal and an intention to be realized. The second
‘‘camp’’ (in which the Dreyfuses place themselves) understands moral practice as a
spontaneous or immediate response to a current interpersonal situation.
Belonging to the first ‘‘camp’’, an approach to moral education that has attracted much
scholarly attention is the research by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates. Their research
focuses on a person’s judgments of moral dilemmas and on the criteria that are involved
when the person tries to solve the different dilemmas. Kohlberg calls their research a
cognitive approach (1980), ‘‘… because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual
education, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child about issues and
decisions. It is called developmental because it sees the aims of moral education as
movement through moral stages’’ (Kohlberg 1980, p. 20). Moral expertise is developed
through universal and invariant stages of moral development and reasoning. The devel-
opment toward higher moral expertise requires active social participation and a discussion
of legal and political issues. The approach is rooted in John Dewey and Jean Piaget’s
thinking about moral stages but also influenced by the philosophy of Socrates and Plato.
This influence can be seen in what Kohlberg considers as a sixth and highest stage of moral
development ‘‘… a stage of universal principles of justice, of equity and respect for human
personality’’ (Kohlberg 1980, p. 20). At stage 6, the individual is able to act on univer-
salized moral principles and to find a balance and prioritize among different demands in
the situation.
The second ‘‘camp’’ sees moral expertise as an unreflective and spontaneous response to
a current interpersonal situation. Dreyfus and Dreyfus are interested in people’s everyday
moral comportment and aim to develop a theory of moral expertise that is adapted to
practices such as care, friendship and love (Information, Sept. 21, 1990). In their opinion, a
moral expert will see what needs to be done and will give an intuitive response to the
concrete situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990, p. 242–244, Benner 1991). For the purposes
of this paper, it is interesting to note that the context of the Dreyfuses’ study is
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interpersonal relations, and they focus on rather ordinary but fundamental forms of moral
practice that are part of people’s everyday moral comportment.
In order to more clearly distinguish between the two camps, Dreyfus and Dreyfus
(1990) quote from the work of Maurice Mandelbaum (1955), who offers a phenomeno-
logical approach to moral experience. Like Piaget and Kohlberg, Mandelbaum also seems
to restrict ethics to individual moral judgments (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 31). However,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus state that, in doing so, Mandelbaum does not seem to realize that he
has already made a fateful exclusionary move, dismissing the fact that ‘‘…our moral
consciousness expresses itself chiefly in everyday ethical comportment which consists of
unreflective, egoless responses to the current interpersonal situation. Why not begin our
investigation of ethical experience on the level of this spontaneous coping?’’ (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus 1990, p. 239) Thus, Dreyfus and Dreyfus proceed to do so.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus appear to allow for the possibility of a type of moral expertise that
Mandelbaum seems to promote, namely the understanding of ethical expertise as reacting
directly and spontaneously to whatever immediately confronts a person: ‘‘I see a child in
danger and catch hold of its hand, I hear a crash and become alert to help’’ (Mandelbaum
1955, p. 48). On the contrary, Mandelbaum believes that these actions are not sufficiently
anchored in the self, and the action does not seem to spring from the self: ‘‘…in such cases
I am reacting directly and spontaneously to what confronts me…. In such cases it is
appropriate to speak of ‘‘reactions’’ and ‘‘responses’’ different from willed actions where
the I has a central place in the action: The action is felt as ‘‘mine’’. ‘‘The I,’’ he continues,
‘‘…is experienced as being responsible for willed action…. When we envision a goal
which transcends what is immediately given, and when we see ourselves realizing that
goal, we feel the action to be ours’’ (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 48). There is a demand in the
situation, a feeling of being called upon; nonetheless, the response to the demand should be
based on willed actions in which the person has a goal or intention. After the action has
been completed, we can study the I in light of the person’s goals and reasons as to why the
moral action has succeeded or not. In response, Dreyfus and Dreyfus begin their analysis
concerning what competent people actually do in concrete situations. They use the term
‘‘egoless’’ to mean ‘‘free of mental content. It does not imply selflessness, self-sacrifice and
the like’’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990, p. 260). If a competent person sees a person in need,
she or he will intuitively know what to do in the actual situation.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest that moral acts in our everyday life consist of unreflective
and egoless responses to the current interpersonal situation. This seems to be consistent with
what the campers experienced—the fact that their response was more or less automatic and
instinctive. One month after the Utøya event, when Mr. and Mrs. Juvet were asked to
comment on the reason for their actions, they responded that they were acting on some kind
of ‘‘autopilot’’ and merely ‘‘did what they had to do’’. There is a difference between saying
after the fact that an action has been executed because ‘‘I had no choice’’ and stating that ‘‘I
acted at that moment based on such and such objectives and principles.’’ Mandelbaum (1955)
writes the following about willed action: ‘‘…asked to explain our action, we feel no hesi-
tation in attributing it to the value of the goal which we aimed to achieve’’ (Mandelbaum
1955, p. 49). In the case of the campers, when asked, they were unable to give a proper reason
for their actions and they seemed incapable of articulating the principle behind their decision
to help. ‘‘It just happened,’’ they said but the rescue operation was well organized. In other
words, the response seemed to be unreflective and almost instinctive but the rescue operation
itself was systematic and rationally organized based on the means they had at hand.
These experiences suggest that it is a complex moral practice that is being expressed,
appealing to emotions, reason and concrete action. It would be too limiting to consider this
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practice mainly a willed, goal-oriented form of practice. Someone is in distress, needing
help. The response seems to be an automatic reaction to the situation at hand, but the act
also expresses subjective autonomy. The further implementation of the act is characterized
by a number of assessments. In the following, I wish to demonstrate how adequate rea-
soning abilities and subjective autonomy are involved.
The Immediate Moral Act and Subjective Autonomy
The campers perceived the situation such that they simply ‘‘had to act’’ on what they had
seen and heard. This is not tantamount to saying that the campers ‘‘just went with the
flow’’, and thus claiming that their actions entail an exclusion of autonomous subjectivity.
On the contrary, their actions are in stark contrast to those of ‘‘the Establishment’’—the
police and rescue crew. They awaited orders and therefore entered the rescue work later.
To borrow an expression from Juhl (2012), the acts of ‘‘the Establishment’’ seem ‘‘frozen’’
and ‘‘congealed’’, whereas the campers in this phase appeared as players who took
responsibility and made brave choices.
Once they leapt into it, the operation was well organized. A number of assessments had
to be made and various tasks were distributed between the guests at the campground. The
entire campground suddenly became involved in the rescue work at hand. In an interview
(Aftenposten, Aug. 23, 2011) with one of the volunteers from the campground named Tone
Merethe Nilsen Kjøle, she said: ‘‘None of us had any previous experience doing such work,
but at this particular moment, everyone acted rationally and managed to figure out what
kind of help was needed and where.’’ Everyone helped out with the rescue work as best
they could.
When discussing the rationality involved, the following description by Sartre (1986)
could be helpful. In his book Etik (1986), he provides a detailed account of the many
assessments that take place between person A, who reaches out his hand to help person B,
who is running to catch the bus. We do not know what triggers this response in person A, but
by reaching out his hand, person A manifests an intention to help. This act will then adapt to
the need, according to Sartre, and thus constitutes a judgment and an assessment of the
situation based on the goal of helping the other person. Person A reaches out his hand at the
correct height, bracing himself to take the weight of the other person. Sartre writes, ‘‘This act
has consisted in allowing an extra point of support to emerge in the world’’ (Sartre 1986,
p. 178). The person running knows that the hand has not been reached out inadvertently. As
far as he is concerned, according to Sartre, something new emerges, a new creation,
something unexpected, undetermined, completely modifying the situation for him and
causing him to make a new choice. The hand is reached out for him to grasp it. He can decide
not to grasp it—for instance if he suddenly recognizes an enemy—but, by accepting the help,
person B helps materialize person A’s ‘‘helping act’’ (Sartre 1986, pp. 178–179).
The campers ran for their boats, while person A on the bus reached out a hand. In both
cases, the act is triggered by something seen and heard. The situation calls for a mobili-
zation of the person’s whole capacity: Emotions, cognitions and a willingness to act. The
‘‘initial act’’ seems spontaneous, but the further help and action contain many rational
assessments. There is also an interpersonal dimension involved. The helping immediacy
that is given and received by the other person creates unexpected mutuality. Acceptance of
the extended hand produces a community of free individuals, as Sartre could have put it.
The sudden kindness is accepted and materialized between them. Could the resulting




Inspired by the thoughts of Martin Buber, a ‘‘moment of goodness’’ is linked to the specific
situation when a helping hand is reached out and accepted by the other person. It happens
between concrete persons, in a particular situation, and it arises suddenly. Martin Buber
would say that the Thou meets me through grace (Buber 2004, p. 17). Interpersonal
phenomena like love, trust and goodness cannot be forced; they are not acquired skills and,
as such, cannot be a result of human mastery (Adorno 1998).
In her description of ‘‘good works’’, Arendt (1998) discusses ‘‘goodness’’. She writes
that good works manifest themselves within the world. They take place within the public
sphere, like other activities. Good works depend on this sphere—the common world we
tread in from birth to death. While goodness is truly not of this world (Arendt 1998, p. 76),
the character of goodness does not fit in because it is destroyed when turned into an
instrument, or when defined as being ‘‘good for’’ something or as ‘‘excellent’’ practice.
Goodness in an absolute sense must be forgotten immediately. When a good work becomes
known and public, it loses its specific character of goodness, of being done for nothing
(Arendt 1998, p. 74).
Neither the information from interviews, nor the stories told afterwards, indicate that the
helpers were extraordinary moral individuals or heroes. They were ordinary people that
suddenly found themselves in a desperate situation. Some were not even aware of their
good work until after the attack was over. People afterwards praised them for their actions,
for actions some had hardly thought about. This seems to be consistent with the experience
expressed by Walker et al. (2010): In retrospect, many moral heroes deflect praise for their
actions, holding that, under similar circumstances, ‘‘anyone would have done what we did’’
(Walker et al. 2010).
Those involved express modesty with respect to their own effort. At the same time, they
operate as ‘‘players’’, demonstrating a high level of action competence in terms of
responding adequately to what they had seen and heard. What I have called ‘‘a moment of
goodness’’ and what Bauman (1987) calls ‘‘a moment of generosity’’ is perhaps morality at
its best? Inspired by Emmanuel Levinas, he describes this as follows: ‘‘Someone plays
without winning…. Something that one does gratuitously, that is grace’’ (Bauman 1987,
p. 214). ‘‘The autonomy of moral behavior,’’ he writes, ‘‘is final and irreducible. It escapes
all codification, as it does not serve any purpose outside itself. Being purposeless, it
escapes all possibility of heteronomous legislation or rational argument; it remains deaf to
conatus essendi, and hence elides the judgment of ‘rational interest’ and advice of cal-
culated self-preservation….’’ (Bauman 1987, p. 214). The act is purposeless and not
triggered by fear of sanction or promise of reward; it does not bring success or prosperity.
However, the experience of goodness might leave a trace that nurtures hope and bears
witness of human community and solidarity in the midst of an inhuman situation.
The description of spontaneity induced by others and the interpersonal dimension
involved could imply another moral base that is different from both a cognitive approach
and an approach that considers the habits and common practices of a society as the most
important. This alternative base will be discussed in the following.
The Silent Demand in Interpersonal Relations
The Danish philosopher Knud E. Løgstrup (1905–1981) develops his ethical philosophy as
a critique of what he characterizes as an illusion from the Period of Enlightenment, namely
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the idea that a human being is ‘‘…an isolated, independent and rational individual’’
(Løgstrup 1987, p. 14). Rather, his outlook is that human beings thrive in relationships. A
basic characteristic of human existence is that human beings live in relationships of mutual
dependence, a characteristic he calls ‘‘interdependence’’, or ‘‘mit-ein-andre-sein, or ‘‘l’eˆtre
avec’’ (Løgstrup 1987, p. 14). He turns our attention toward ethical phenomena of human
existence, such as openness, forgiveness, compassion, love, and trust—elementary phe-
nomena of our existence with respect to interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, while
these phenomena may be described as facts, according to Løgstrup, this in itself is
insufficient, as the phenomena place demands on people as well. Løgstrup argues that since
both descriptive and normative elements are inherent in interpersonal phenomena, a suf-
ficient description must also include the phenomena’s inherent demands (Løgstrup 1976,
p. 48). His concern here is to point out that there is an intimate connection between fact and
demand; to a great extent, the demand grows out of the fact. ‘‘In other words’’, he writes,
‘‘the fact forces upon us the alternative: Either we take care of the other person’s life or we
ruin it…. To accept the fact without listening to the demand is to be indifferent to the
question whether life is to be promoted or ruined’’ (Løgstrup 1997, p. 9).
For example, consider the issue of trust. In describing its nature, Løgstrup uses different
expressions like a person ‘‘…surrendering himself, going out of himself, placing something
of his own life into the hands of the other person’’ (Løgstrup 1997, p. 16). Such an act
places an expectation on the other person. How much or how little is at stake for a person
who has placed his or her trust in another varies greatly, according to Løgstrup, as it
depends on several different factors:
But in any event this trust means that in every encounter between human beings,
there is an unarticulated demand, irrespective of the circumstances in which the
encounter takes place and irrespective of the nature of the encounter. Regardless of
how varied the communication between persons may be, it always involves the risk
of one person daring to lay him- or herself open to the other in the hope of a
response. This is the essence of communication, and it is the fundamental phe-
nomenon of ethical life (Løgstrup 1997, p. 17).
The ethical demand present in any human relationship is unspoken, and it is not voiced in
expressed or implied expectations. Although Løgstrup elaborates upon this idea in great
detail, I am forced in this paper to limit myself to stating his conclusion, which is that the
silent demand is implied as an interdependent fact of human existence, and that human
lives are interwoven. Therefore, since we are connected in a common life-world, we owe it
to one another to care for each other in the interdependent state to which we all belong.
However, even if the essence of the demand is to take care of the other person’s life, the
ethical demand does not tell us how this caring should be carried out: ‘‘It is the essence of
the demand that with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses, a
person must figure out for him- or herself what the demand requires’’ (Løgstrup 1997,
p. 22). In other words, individuals must take responsibility for how the ethical demand in
interpersonal encounters is to be met—especially if conflicts or fractures arise. In these
instances, the individual must justify his or her actions and choices.
One interesting aspect of Løgstrup’s presentation is what he asserts as the ideal moral
practice, namely when it is done spontaneously—for example, when trust is immediately
safeguarded. He argues that, under normal circumstances, people tend to encounter one
another with natural trust, even when it comes to strangers. This may indeed seem strange,
but it is part of what it means to be human. He continues:
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We would simply not be able to live: our life would be impaired and wither away if
we were in advance to distrust one another, if we were to suspect the other of
thievery and falsehood from the very beginning (Løgstrup 1997, pp. 8–9).
When we respond spontaneously to the other person, Løgstrup would say that the demand
inherent in the interpersonal relationship is fulfilled. It is the presence of the other that
induces the first person’s trust and sincerity; the other person’s misfortune induces the first
person’s compassion—and in light of the openness and connection that have been
established, the ethical demand is fulfilled (Løgstrup 1976, p. 22).
According to Armgard 1981, this means that ‘‘…the person’s attitude and practice are
determined by an immediate focus on the situation and on the person’s need’’ (Armgard
1981, p. 113). At this point Løgstrup draws a line between responding to the need of the
other, and establishing community. The responding person opens up to the other, and is
thereby drawn into the community.
To summarize so far: Previously, moral practice from Utøya has been elaborated on in
light of ethical theories and based on the field of moral education. A cognitive develop-
ment-oriented approach appears too narrow. The basis of the moral acts cannot be limited
to rational and intellectual skills alone. This must also be seen in relation to the dramatic
nature of the situation, as opposed to discussing real and imagined moral dilemmas in a
relaxed atmosphere. Proximity to other people’s distress seems to activate a wide range of
human capacities: Reason, emotions, the ability to be attentive and the willingness to act.
Furthermore, a moral basis in which morality is primarily linked to habits and common
practices will also have its limitations. ‘‘The true subject’’, according to Heilman (2005),
can be lost under the insidious effects of institutions and instrumental rationality. When a
person is giving a spontaneous expression, he or she will merely copy what they have
learnt and thus merely express values and ideals that exist in the established system
(Heilman 2005, pp. 117–118). In this case, it is especially the people at the campground
who acted contradictory to ‘‘the Establishment’’, such as the police and rescue crew. This
demonstrated a high degree of subjective autonomy combined with an ability to plan and
organize. This ability to go beyond the given has created a desire to explore another basis
for the moral acts. Knud E. Løgstrup has presented a philosophical approach to ethics
based in an interpersonal dimension where spontaneity is considered the best way to fulfill
the ethical demand involved. In addition, there are the various stories of how help was
given and received and how this created ‘‘moments of goodness’’. The moments arose from
concrete relations, but went beyond these.
The event at Utøya was an extreme situation. This could raise the question of whether a
discussion about morals and ethics associated with this event could contribute anything to
the field of general education. Despite this apprehension, I will discuss how a broad
approach to the field of moral education could be of relevance in the current debate on
education in general. I will do so in light of the three different domains of education
proposed by Biesta (2010).
From Moral Education to General Education: A Discussion
Norway does not have a strong tradition for defining moral education as a particular field of
interest and research (Bergem 1994). The fostering of moral and ethical thinking and
qualities is considered to be an integral part of a broad, general education program. The
school is to provide a broad, general education, which also involves developing skills that
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enable the learners to behave morally and to make a commitment to society and to caring
for the environment (The Curriculum for the 10-Year Compulsory School in Norway,
1999, p. 55). There will then be a focus on both the cultivation of the human self and on the
individual as a member of the civil society (Gustavsson 2001).
In recent years, Norway, as with other European countries, has become influenced by
political and ideological ideas that have contributed to a closer connection between edu-
cation and economic growth. A basic question is how to strengthen the youngster’s skills
and competence for the world of tomorrow. The implications of these changes are many,
for instance a stronger concern for objectives and learning outcomes (Policy Document
‘‘Culture of Learning’’, no. 30, 2003–2004). During this process, it has proven difficult to
break down broad, complex objectives to individual, measureable units. Ethical and value-
related aspects of education have become less visible and have wound up in the back-
ground because these aspects are difficult to adapt to the prevailing ideology. On the other
hand, during the last decade, a renewed interest in Bildung has arisen, but so far without
significant political backing. This interest often acts as a corrective to a perception that
education is merely about acquiring of a set of skills that the politicians have defined as
important.
Even though there will be differences between the field of moral education and a
Bildung tradition, they do have one aspect in common, namely an openness toward pro-
found issues of human existence. According to Eidsva˚g (2011), the renewed interest in
Bildung has contributed to renewed acceptance for asking the following types of questions
in an educational setting: What is man? What is the purpose of education? (Eidsva˚g, 2011,
p. 158; Biesta 2006). Within both the field of moral education and Bildung—there is room
to go beyond the predominant paradigm to basic educational questions.
In the following, I will analyze the previous discussion about moral education in light of
a broad, general description of education. This is in order to demonstrate that the field of
moral education could contribute something to all of the three dimensions of education
suggested by Biesta (2010, p. 19–22). Based on the experiences from Utøya, there will be a
particular emphasis on the last dimension.
Three Different Domains of Education and the Role of Moral Education
In his book Good Education in an Age of Measurement (2010), Gert Biesta suggests three
different but overlapping domains of education: qualification, socialization and subjecti-
fication (Biesta 2010, p. 14).
Qualification, according to Biesta (2010), is one of the major functions of organized
education. Education aims to provide children and young people with knowledge, skills
and forms of judgment that allow them to ‘‘do something’’ (Biesta 2010, p. 20). In this
respect, a cognitive moral development tradition could contribute competence in the
development of cognitive skills that enable the pupils to carefully investigate and judge
complex dilemmas. Thinking skills are stimulated by solving different dilemmas, and
schools can enable pupils to gain experience with solving such dilemmas. The pupils will
be stimulated to develop their own moral thinking rather than being taught fixed moral
rules. Kohlberg’s interest is particularly directed toward the cognitive structure and the
form of moral judgment rather than toward the content (Rich and DeVitis 1985, p. 99).
Cognition can be tested. Different tests have been developed to measure different forms of
thinking abilities but the tests have also been criticized (Gilligan 1982; Rest 1986; Bergem
1990). We know that, in the future, we will be faced with a number of complicated ethical
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dilemmas within disciplines such as health, technology and welfare. The solutions to these
dilemmas will require advanced moral skills and analytical competence to ensure good and
fair solutions.
The socialization function, according to Biesta (2010), has to do with the many ways in
which, through education, ‘‘…we become part of particular social, cultural and political
‘orders’’’ (Biesta 2010, p. 20). The transition can happen explicitly or implicitly, for
instance as a result of ‘‘the hidden curriculum’’. Dreyfus and Dreyfus emphasize the
importance of moral expertise derived from training and socialization within a certain
community. They underline the significance of broad moral training based on the habits
and common social practices found within a community. In that sense, transferring morally
legitimate examples and stories to children and young people would be important. They
argue that, during the formative process, it is decisive that children are active and test out
rules in different situations (Information, Sept 21, 1990).
In a Bildung perspective, a broad cultivation of the child is emphasized. It is not only
about acquiring moral skills, but about developing the whole repertoire of human qualities.
In addition, there is an assumption that the richness and breadth of a society’s moral and
cultural expressions could also serve as a barrier against the inhumane—contrasting, in this
context, with the terrorist, who reduced training to a narrow field. He trained himself to
block out all influence from the surroundings and to pay no attention to others. In his book
An Encounter (2009/2013), Kundera, under the heading ‘‘Forgetting Schoenberg’’, writes
about the role of art in the ghetto Theresienstadt. Among the prisoners there were many
intellectuals and artists. He writes that concerts were a way of maintaining a broad range of
emotions under inhuman conditions and keeping an open mind to prevent life from being
reduced to only one dimension, namely horror’’ (Kundera 2013, p. 164). At a different time
and in a different situation, the terrorist at Utøya demonstrated what can happen to man
when life is reduced to only one dimension. The door to barbarism and dehumanization is
wide open. What we can learn from this is the importance of maintaining everyday
communities characterized by a wide range of activities. The activities indirectly influence
the moral formation of the whole person and can also help people remain open and aware
and thereby prevent brutality and terror.
The subjectification function, according to Biesta (2010), is not about the insertion of
‘‘newcomers’’ into existing orders, but about the process of becoming a subject: ‘‘… a
process that allows those educated to become more autonomous and independent in their
thinking and acting’’ (Biesta 2010, p. 21). Inspired by Hannah Arendt, he writes that
subjectivity is no longer seen as an attribute of individuals, but is understood as a quality of
human interaction. A human being can only come into presence in the world as a result of
the ways in which others respond to him or her (Biesta 2006, pp. 106–107). This illustrates
an interpersonal dimension as well as a risk, implying that, within this domain, education
can never be reduced to a production process (Biesta 2014).
Previously, in the Løgstrup-inspired approach to morals and ethics, it is suggested that
there is an ethical demand inherent in each encounter between people—a demand for trust,
openness and charity, and the spontaneous action is triggered by the other person. In our
everyday life, the unarticulated demands are often fulfilled without reflection. According to
Løgstrup, it is an assumption that, when moral actions fulfil demands for trust, openness
and charity, justifications are seldom required. Justifications are only required when the
demand is neglected, overlooked or misused. The demand for justification is activated only
when spontaneity is no longer functioning, when there are conflicting interests requiring a
clarification of various principles. The campers who spontaneously responded to the ethical
demand had difficulties explaining and justifying their actions afterwards; but according to
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Løgstrup, it is only when a spontaneous challenge goes unanswered that the action needs to
be justified.
The terrorist intentionally chose to create a distance to all areas of life that might disturb
his plan. He forced himself to not succumb to the ethical challenges that arise in a common
life-world. I would also like to argue that he thereby also deprived himself of the right to be
an individual, as expressed by Løgstrup: ‘‘To be an individual, a self, implies that
something is required of me. And this, in turn, means that the moment something is
required of me, it is I who must answer for what I do or do not do’’ (Løgstrup 1997, p. 66).
From the very start of the attack, the terrorist wore a uniform. He was a warrior in a battle
he had himself defined. All along, he was a man playing a role, and this role he also took on
in court. The question is: Is he about to lose himself?
Buber (2004) describes subjectivity as relational, taking the form of either an I and Thou
relationship or an I and It relationship. The sphere of the I and It constitutes all mental acts
that are directed toward an object. However, when the Thou is spoken, the person is
directly confronting a being external to him- or herself (Buber 2004, p. 12). The rela-
tionship to the world has now changed from objectification to being. The encounter with
the Thou is mutual and can be risky. It contains surprises different from a mastery position
like the I and It relationship (Kristiansen 1996). The terrorist demonstrates, to the extreme,
a type of mastery position that is frozen and congealed, and where all surprises are threats.
Taking the leap from this discussion into classroom life may be an abrupt transition, but
these experiences are apt to demonstrate the importance of a community dimension, not
only in terms of developing humanity but also as a barrier against darkness. It is of
fundamental importance for a child to develop his or her subjectivity together with others.
The I and Thou encounter also bears existential qualities. Friedman (1983) describes it as
participation ‘‘…the courage to address and the courage to respond’’ (Friedman 1983,
p. 22). Buber is more explicit in stating that the reciprocity also holds an existential
dimension—a ‘‘liberating insight’’ (Buber 1978, p. 106) that human beings are not isolated
and alone anymore. The feeling of belonging and community creates hope: ‘‘Because this
human being exists, in the darkness the light lies hidden, in fear salvation, and in the
callousness of one’s fellow-men the great Love’’ (Buber 1978, p. 98). Martin Buber here
seems to describe the experience of the young survivors in caring for each other, namely
that the proximity and openness toward each other became significant dimensions of
meaning—not only during but also after the attack.
Toward the End
Sometimes, crisis situations can tell us what really matters. Spontaneous help and care did
not only save lives but also became a source of ‘‘moments of goodness’’ which were
meaningful, not only in the situation, but also afterwards. The helping immediacy was an
expression of humanity and of great courage amidst the hell that these people were in.
The most frequent debate in the field of education today is not a discussion of how to
better foster humanity and provide young people with a capability to care for and help
others. Perhaps this discussion should have a higher priority in the future? I have attempted
to prove the relevance of various moral educational approaches in a general educational
setting. I have suggested that the different types of moral education may have a vital role to
play within all of the three dimensions that Biesta (2010) describes as functions of edu-
cation. However, when it comes to the experiences from Utøya, the issue of subjectivity
and the interpersonal aspects are of particular importance. The terrorist’s thinking and
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action demonstrated the horrific consequences of the use of distancing techniques in many
areas of life. To prevent this from happening, it may be expedient, within an educational
setting, to focus on the teaching community and its inherent opportunities for providing
experiences of mutual recognition and participation.
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